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The use of drugs is a major problem in modern society. There is drug related
criminal activity of both suppliers and consumers. There are health risks involverl
in the consumption of drugs. In most countries leading politicians on the national
level advocate prohibition of the consumption of drugs. Yet, drug prohibit.ion
policy is difficult t.o enforce. Despite major efforts like the `~var on dn;gs" in
the United States, drug business is flourishing. Although there is a market, lor
drugs where supply and demand determine the price, not many economists are
involved in drug research. A rare example is Chaloupka and Saffer (19~5) who
find for the annual prevalence of heroin a price elasticity of -0.90 and for tl:e
annual prevalence of cocaine a price elasticit.y of -0.55. Grossman, Chaloupka
and Brown (1996) find that the frequency of use of cocaine by American yout,h
is also price sensitive. Economists who are involved in drug reseazch seem to be
in favor of a more liberal policy towards drug ttse. IL4iron and Zwiebel (1995)
advocat.e that prohibition of drugs may not be the right answer to the problem.
Becker is also an advocate of drug legalization: "Legalizing dntgs will not soh~e
every problem. But it is the best feasible solut.ion" (Becker and Becker (1997)) I
The main problem with an economic analysis ofdrug markets is that drugs are
currently illegal. Therefore, it. is difficuit to get good dat.a as a basis for analysis.
Yet, economic parameters are very important. In t.he discussion about the pros
and cons of the legalization of drugs, information about the size of the price
elasticity of drugs can be ttsefiil. Legalization will probably le.ad to snhstantially
lower prices. A combination of lvgh price elasticities and low prices will expand
drug use substantially. However, legalization oi the drug m~rrket. may also have
an autonomous negative effect. on drug trse. It. could be t.hat. if dntgs are cheaper
and mote easy to get. t.han t.hey are today, drug addicts have no incent.ive to sell
rírugs themselves and pttsh ot.her people to st.art consrmring drugs.
This paper uses data from about a cent.ury ago, when the ,tse of opiwn, a
hard drug, was not prohibit.ed. We analyze historical data from Java, t.he main
island of t.he Dutch East Indies (present day Indonesia). We consider the period
1873-1907, during which there was a transition from one policy regime to the
ot,her. Private opium monopolies established by the government were graduall,y
replaced by a monopoly from t.he government itself, known as t.he opium rege.
We use hist.orical informat.ion to shed light on current drug issues. We present.
estimates of the price elasticity of opium and we analyze the size of t.he incent.ive
~Other examptes of a discussion on alternative drug policies aze Claglre (1973), bloore (1973),
White and Luksetich (1983).
~effect which was caused by the change in opiimr policy.
Dutclt infíuence in the Indiatr archipelago started in the early seventeenth
c~entury with limited control over the area. In the early nineteenth century, they
were in fiill control of Java whereas on the other islands they only had strongholds.
By t.he end of the nineteenth century the Dutch became interested in controlling
all islands of the archipelago. However, it took them tmtil the early twentiet.h
ccnt.ury before they managed to do so.
Opium has been a money making business in the Dutch East Indics from the
seventeenth up t.o the twentieth century.2 Dutch involvement in the opictm trade
startc~d soon aft.er t.he foimding of the Dutch East Indies Company, the VOC
( Uerenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie), in 1602. Initially t.his company bought
raw opium in India, paid with silver, and bartered it against spices in the East.
htdian ~uchipelrtgo ~Vhen in t.he eazly 17th century the Dutch took over hlalacca
from the Portuguc. ~se they started to trade in opiwn on a regular basis. For a}nm-
dred years they auctioned opium in Batavia (present-day Jakarta). After that,
there ktavc been several ways in which the Dutch government directly or indi-
rf~t.ly cont.rolled t.he opiitm market in the Dutch East Indíes. In the second half
of the eighteent.h cent.ttry a private opittm corporation which had bouglrt from
the VOC the right to auction opium controlled the opium supply. In the nine-
teent.h c~entury there were opittm tax farms. Lacking sufficient adcninistrative
capacit.y for collect.ing taxes the Dutch government auctioned district monopoly
c~oncessions for selling opiunt, the so called opittm tax farms. Opittm was tised
by reg,tlar consumers as well as by consttmers who restrict,ed their use to specia]
occ~asions. For urany people using opittm was very costly. Yet., it. was preferred
to alcohol by many, Uecause opium did not affect outward behavior that much.
Therefore opium users coulcí maintain dec:orum. Becaitse opium was quite ex-
pensive the majority of opium tisers consurned small quantities, thereby escaping
severe addiction. As Rt~sh (1990) puts it "the characteristic form of opinm con-
sictnpt.ion in trineteent.h-centitry Java was the regttlar or intermittent smoking of
very small amoimts of morphine-weak opium preparations by lazge tntmbers of
Javanese people".
Associated with opium farms were abttses like the smuggling of illegal opiunt.
Under the syst.em of private monopolies tax fazmers had a big incentive to stim-
ulate consitmptiatt of opium in order to increase their profits. Fitrthermore, the
wealt.h of tax farmers was believed to induce corruption of government of6cials.
ZColonial opium revenues were important in other Southeast Asian colonies as well, for
~xample in Hongkong, the Federated ;t4alay States, the Straits settlement, Ftench Indo-China,
Furmosa, Siam and The Philippines.
3By the end of t.he nineteenth century a new scheme was gradually inkroduced.
Under this scheme, the opium regie, import., refinement and retailing were firlly
under control of the government. The basic idea was t.o control excessive opium
constrmption by keeping prices high. By having salaried employees do the ret.ail-
ing there was no direct incentive for retailers t.o stimulate opium corLSUmption.
The opium tegie lasted tmtil the Japanese invasion of 1942.
Previous work on opium constunption in the Dutch East hidies gívcs some
indications about the natrtre of this type of consumpt.ion. In Van Ours (1995)
information gathered during the 1923-1938 period of the opium regie is trsed to
estimate income and price elasticities of the demand for opium for t.wo different
groups of consruners: Chinese and Indigenotrs. The estimated short term income
elasticities of opium aze about 0.8, the long t.erm are about 1.3. The estimated
short-term price elast.icities are about -0.7, long-term price elasticities are about.
-1.0. Van Ortrs concludes from this that opium was not very addictive. This
conchrsion is in line with the opinion of most contemporary colonial researchers
(Van Luijk (1992)) and with the observation by Rush (1990) that Javanese expe-
rienced many income and price fluctuations over time so that opium consumers
were accustomed to externally imposed variatíon in their consumption3.
In Van Luijk and Van Ours (1998) regional differences in opium consnmption
are studied for t.he year 1930. It appears that. in distsicts wit.h strict, opium
regimes smoking was less widespread'. Flrrthennore, differences bet.~vE~e-n the
districts were mainly due to differences in t.he numbers of light smokers. Finally,
it is found that in districts with high opirun price opiutn use was less widespread.
The current paper is about opirun constunption in t.he last. years of tax farming
and the first yeazs ofthe regie, covering a total period ofabout 35 yean. From t.his
period, annual opium data are available for 15 Javanese districts. We analyze this
period becatrse we are interested in t.he determinants of opium constunption and
we want to invest.igat.e whether or not. the change in opiturr policy from tax farm
to government monopoly reduced opitun consumption. If there was such an effect
then t.his must. have been due to the disappeararrce of the profit,-led incentive t.o
stimulat.e opium consumption. From the existence of such an effect we can draw
inferences about what. might. happen if the present drug prohibit,ion is changed
int.o sorne sort of government controlled legalization of drug ttse. This too could
reduce drug consumption because the incentive to ptrsh drug trse vanishes.
3In the yeazly accounts of the opium regie changes in regional consumption were mostly
explained by economic factors. See also Lubbers (1935).
'There were so-callecí closed districts in which opium use was prohibited except for the cities
within this re.gion where consumption was regulated.
4This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a short history of the
opium bt~siness in the Dutch East Indies, distingtushing several periods with
different types of government intervention. Sectíon 3 discusses the final years of
the opium tax farm and the first years ofgovernment monopoly more thoroughly.
In this section we also present our data. Section 4 gives the results ofthe empirical
analysis. Section 5 presents conch~sions.
2 A short history of opium in Java
2.1 The early history
In the early seventeenth centttry the VOC stazted its activities in the Indian
archipelagos. These activities were more of the war type than commercial, until
in 1640 the VOC took over Malacca from the Portuguese. Now Duteh ships had
a free passage through the Strait of Malacca, and the VOC could expand its
trade between opitun producing India and Batavia. Initially the VOC bought
raw opium in Saratte at the West Coast. of India. In 1659 the VOC stazted to
import directly form Bengal, which was the most important opium producing
region of India. Two years later this `Bengal connection' was firmly assiued by
a treaty between the VOC and the Great Mogul of Bengal. Opitun business
flourished and proved to be very profitable, but it still was a commodity of minor
importance. The VOC cotild not draw full benefit from the Javanese opitun
market for two reasons. First, it had to deal with fierce competition from other
seafaring Eiuopean nat.ions and Asians. Second, it had no access t.o the interior
mazket of .Iava. This situation changeá dramatically when in 1677 the king of
Afataram (Central Java) granted the monopoly right on the importation of opíiun
in his territory t.o t.he VOC in exchange of assistance in case of war. The following
year opium import. in Batavia almost sevenfolded.
In Batavia opiilm was sold in lazge quantities to the highest bidder who got a
permit to bring the opitim to one of the other Javanese harbors or one ofthe other
islands. In doing so toll taxes and export duties had to be paid. T~ansportation
into the inland of .Java was also subject to these taxes.
The opiiun bt~siness was a sotuce of income for all parties involved. The VOC
got. the difference between the price they paid in Bengal and the suction price in
Batavia. The opitun wholesalers got. the difference between the auction price in
Batavia and the price they received in the sea-harbors. Finally, the indigenous
SI3sud (1853) tells an excellent story about the early history of opium use. Ricklefs (1993)
gi~.es a detailed description of the history of Indonesia.
5nrlers had benefits from the tax on import in harbors and t.ransport. over land.
Still, for smugglers it was beneficial to avoid the intermediary of the VOC. Aiany
ligh VOGofficials were invoh~ed in smuggling opiurn.
In an attempt to reduce opium smuggling the Opium Corporation (Amphioen
sociëteit) was established. The VOC was forced to sell the right. of the opinm
trade within the Dutch East Indies to the Opimn Corporat.ion, wluch in exchange
took the obligation to buy an annual fixed amount of opium at a fixed (high)
price. The difference between this fixed price and the price of opittm sold by
the corporation was intended as a profit for the shareholders who t.hus had au
incentive to sell at least the fixed amotmt of opitun. The shareholders of t.he
corporation also had an incentive to combat smuggling, because this lowered
the opitun market price. However, the system failed in reducing the smuggling
of opium. The non-shazeholders did not have a disincentive for their smuggling
activities. Fhrthermore, as time went by, more and rnore shareholders on t.he spot
rettrrned to the Netherlands. So, there was a decreasing number of shareholders
which could participate in anti-smuggling activities. In 179~i a war broke out.
between the Netherlands and England and the Dutch were cut off from opiurn
supply. In 1798 the VOC went bankrupt.
2.2 The opium tax farm
In 1806 a new system ofcontrol of the opitrm Utusiness was introdu~cd in 1ava: the
opium tax farm (Diehl (1983), Rush (1990))6. The opium tax farm was ttsed by
the government. as a way to collect t.axes without having to sek up a sophist.icat.ed
financial administration. The right to collect taxes in a specific region on behalf
of t,he Dutch government was publicly auct.ioned. The highest bidder gained the
monopoly right to farm taxes in the region involvecí. The opium t.ax fann was
one of many tax farms that were introduced in the Dutch East Indies. Other
examples are t.he bazaar lease (the right to tax goods offered for sale in markets),
the slaughtering of cattle and pigs, fishing and the supply of fishing nets, the sale
of arrac~k and other strong liquors, the practice of cert.ain occupations, t.he poll-
tax on Chinese, the import and ctiltivation of tobacco, toll bridges, river crossings
and sht;ces, the harvesting of birds' nests, timber from forest, products from the
Seribu Islands near Batavia, wayang performances, pawn-shop and gambling-
houses (The Siauw Giap (1989)). But, compared to the revenue of the opium tax
sFrom 1811-1816 the British occupied Java. The British governor Raffles tried to abolish
or at least reduce the opium consumption but did not succeed. When the Dutch took over in
1816 they again introduced the tax fazm system as a source of governme,it revenue.
ffarm these other farms were peanuts.
The system of opitun farms in the Dutch East Indies was not unique. In
ot.her areas in colonial Southeast Asia similar systems existed (see for exan.ple
~ocki (1987, 1990) and Butcher (1983)). Raw opittm was imported from British
India (Bengal opittm) and the IVfiddle East (Levant opittm). The government
of the Dutch East Indies sold it. to the tax farmers, who refined it into the
smokeable variety Candu and distributed it to local opium retailers. The colonial
governments benefited substantially from the opittm business. Over the period
1816-1915 the cumttlated colorrial stuphts from the Dutch East Indies was 480
rnillion Dutch gttilders, while there were 1080 million guilders of opitrm revenues.
If it. had not been for opium, there would have been a colonial deficit of 600
million Dutch guilders (Diehl (1983)).
The idea of farming out opium taxes is basically very simple. One jttst. has
to have an anctiott selling the tax farming right to the highest bidder. Yet, in
the early period of the opium tax farm, the institutional structtue wa~ clianged
rnany tirnes. The main reason for this was that the Dutch goverrtment did not
have one optimizing criterium but two. First, it wanted to restrict consumption
of opium. SE~cond, it. wanted to have a lot of revenues from the tax farm, maybe
even maximum revenue. A complicating factor was the smuggling of opium. .4
high opium consttmer price would reduce constrmption, increase profit per amotmt.
sold but. decrease the amonnt sold because high prices wotild make smuggling very
attractive.
In the early years of the tax farm system the import of opiutn was free.
During these years American and British traders introduced opium from the
y{iddle East. in t.he Javanese market (Baud (1853)). In 1824 the system was
changed by ext.ending t.he fartn dist.ricts and t,he license period t.o three years.
In 1827 the exclusive right to import opium into Java was given to the Dutch
Trading Company (NHt~I) which also got the license to sell opium. The NHM did
not engage in retail sales but at first let out this right to Cltinese subcontractors
and later auctioned sub-licenses.
Fl~om 1833 onwards the monopoly concession for refming and selling of opittm
in a specific region was auctioned. Over the period of the tax farm the the rules of
the auction were changed several times. In 1873 the tax farrning system worked
under the rules as described in the next section.
In t.he second half of the nineteenth century opittm consttmption increased
ronsiderably. The Dutch colonial suthorities were content with the increasing
opium revenues, but in the Netherlands there was rising discomfort with the latter
development. Like in England and the U.S., anti-opittm sentiments were partly
7stirred by missionaries (Lodwick (1996)). Also important was an open letter to
the Dutch king of Be Ik Sam, a former tax farmer. In his letter he described the
shortcomings of the t.ax farm syst.em and made suggestions for its improt-ement.
His suggestions however were considered to be too far-goíng.. Around 1890 the
political opium debate in The Netherlands wa5 at. its peak. Anti-opium forces
organized themselves in an anti-opium association. Among them were at least
t.en members of Dutch parliament. hlany critics were in favor of total prohibition
of opirtm. However, lazge sc.ale opitun consumption had been a reality for many
decades. Total prohibition wotild induce smuggling, which was diffictilt. t.o cont.ro]
due to the enormous coastlines of the Indian archipelago. "Prohibition mearrs
surrounding the East Indies by a cordon", said former director of colonial finance
and expert on opium affairs Wiselius (1886), who was known to be a prohibitionist
by heart. In stead, a new and more pragmatic system was introducecí which
gradually replaced the opirun tax fazm.
2.3 Government monopoly
The new system of opium control introduced in t.he late nineteenth centurv was
the opium reglP., a government monopoly on the importat.ion, preparation and
distribution of opium. It was supposed to achieve three policy goals: First,
reduction of criminality by cntshing the power of ttte mighty opium dealers.
ending the corntption and violence caused by opium transactions and reducing
illegal opium sale in the regions as well as int.ernational smuggling. Second,
reducing health risks by guaranteeing a product of constant cluality and pureness.
Third, reducing opium use.
It. were the Freuch who first implemented an opium regie in Sontheast. Asia.
They st.azted t.his regie in Indo-China in 1881'. The Dutch studied the weaknesses
of the French regie system thoroughly before they introduced a sirnilar system in
t.heir own realm. In the French system the colonial government. manufactnred and
distributed opium t.o wholesale outlets and then licensed local agents to service
the retail trade. The Dutch, wanting to eliminate the Chinese from opium tracíe,
also controlled retail opium t.rade, which they put. into the hands of salariecí
state employeos. The opium rPgie intended to eliminate abuses associat.ed with
opium farms. Opium tax farmers encortraged opium use by employing hawkers
to peddle opitrm in the villages. Furthermore, opitrm farm employees received a
portion of their wagPS in opitun, so they corild increase their income by pedcíling.
rThe Japanese had a similar system of government monopoly in Taiwan (Liu, Liu and Cho~i-
(1996)).
8Opium tax farmers cotild increase their profits even more by importing illegal
opium. The idea of the regie was that supply of opium shotild be tmlimited, but
to limit consumption the state should sell opitun at high fixed prices. Therefore,
a strong land- and sea-based opitun police was neecíed to prevent illegal opium
from flowing into Java.
In 1893 the law on the opium regie was accepted in the Dutch parliament.
The opium regie was controlled by a government bttresu witlun t.he Finaztce
Depart.ment. The tegie's first opitun factory started in 1894. In stead of each
farmer separately refining his opium there was now a central factory close to the
capital Batavia. Now, the quality of opitun was tmiform throughout Java. The
opium fact.ory expanded rapidly. In 1905 it had 630 employees, a number which
increased to more than 1000 in 1913. The opium regie started as an experiment
on the island of bladttra near the Javanese coast on September 1, 1894. The
experimenk proved to be a succrss, and in 1898 the Dutch goverrunent decided to
implement the opiurn regie district by district all over Java. Implementation in
Java was completcd during 1903. It took tmtíl 1914 before the opium regie was
inrroducE~d in all parts of the Dutch East Indies.
In the early years of the opium regie for opittm constuners there was not much
difference from the t,vc farming system. Later on, in the 1910s consumers were
regist.ered and starting in 1923 consumers had to obtain a license before t.hey
were allowed to buy opium in the government shops.
The opium regie operated on the principle of regional differentiation. The
main reason for differentiating policy measures along regional lines was t.hat the
opium smoking habit did not. occur everywhere at. the same level. In some re-
gions, like t.he Islarnic regions of West Java, opitun smoking was not widespread.
If opium smoking was almost. absent, the sale of legal opium - if there was any
- was stopped, and t.he ttse of opium was actually forbidden. In other regions
opituu smoking was almost as common as nowadays alcohol drinking in West-
ern countries. This was especially the case in regions with substantial Chinese
commurrities, or regions with large estates like the East Coast of Sumatra. The
labor fotce on these agrictilttiral, export:producing estates was to a large degree
recruited from ot.her parts of East Asia, and many of these displaced temporary
contract workers already were opium smokers on arrival, or else soon afterwards.
By and large the Chinese poptrlation and contract workers (often overlapping
categories) w-ere subjer,t to less strict opittm rules than the Indigenotrs and Euro-
pcan parts of the poptilation.e The ttse of opium was widespread among Chinese,
dThe society in the Dutch East Indies was highly segregated (Fasseur (I992)). In terrus of
the colonial law one was either European, Native or Chinese. The racial status determined
9and the average quantity of opium constuned by Chinese was much higher than
t,he consumption by Indigenous. In 1930 there were about 41 tnillion Indigenous
and 600,000 Chinese on Java. There were 77,000 Indigenous opium consumers
and 18,000 Chinese opium consumers. Yet, t,he t,otal anmtal consumpt,ion of In-
digenous and Chinese was about the same, both approximately 10.000 kilogrxrns
(Van Luijk and Van Ours (1998))
3~om tax farm to government monopoly
3.1 The transition period
The last period of tax farming starts in 1873 when new and simple rules were
introduced.9 Under the system the tax fazmer paid a fixed amount for the district
based monopoly rights and had to buy all his raw opium from the Dutch govern-
ment at a fixed price of approximately 50 gtulders per kílogram. The monopoly
right was auctioned in every district separately. Usually a Chinese firm ('kongsi')
was the highest bidder.lo A typical contract specified the exchtsive right. to refine
and retail opitun in a clearly defined territory, the duration of the coutract (from
one to three years), the farm fee and the cost of ptrrchasing t.he opium from the
government. Also, the contract specified the maximum amotmts of Levant and
Bengal opium t.he farmer wotild receive as well as alist of all the legal opium stores
in the district.tt The tax farmer was free to set his own price and was allowed
to sell opium to any consumer within lus district alt.hough there was a maximum
daily amotmt. for individual consumers. Part. of t.he wage of the farm employc, ~es
was paid in opium. These employees supplemented their incomes by peddling.
To protect his monopoly the farmer hired so called "mata-mata", policemen and
det.ectives who routinely paid visits to farm ctistomers who were sttspected of
buying on t.he black market. Still, there was a lot of smuggling. According to
where one could live, what taxes one paid, to which laws and courts one was subject and, if
found guilty of a crime, how (and with what degree of harshness) one was punished. (Rush
(1990)). It was even determined that one should dress according to his own racial group.
9Rush (1990) gives an excellent description of the tax fazming system and the transition to
government monopoly.
~oSometimes it a.as not the highest bidder that got the monopoly right if the Dutch doubted
whether the highest bidder was strong enough to meet the term of the contract. If the results of
an auction were unsatisfacton~ and the Dutch sensed a conspiracy between candidate fazmers
a second public auction was held or confidential bíds were accepted.
~~There were also many illegal opium stores and dens in every district. ln 1ts90 there was
an estimated number of 13,000 of these illegal stores and dens on Java. The number of of3icial
opium dens was about 1,(b0.
10Ruslt (1990) at least half of the opium constuned in Java was officially illegal.
Snntggling was a major operation which required the pazticipation and cooper-
ation of several individuals aztd groups: the purchaser himself and his personal
clients; trading firms that extended credit, and batilcs that provided facilities for
the secret. exchange of money; agents and middlemen who specialized in execut-
ing the t.rartsfer of opittm from whoíesaler to ptuchaser; boatmen and their crews
who shipped the opittm to its Javanese destinations; and finally the teams of
men who brought it ashore and delivered it to its ptuchaser. Sometimes opium
farmers t.hemselves were engaged in smuggling as a way to get cheaper opium,
lower their average price and compete with the black market. According to Rttsh
(1990) " The key w~s controlling both legal and illegal opium. Farmers therefore,
while sometimes smuggling themselves, did their utmost to inhibit and tmder-
rnine snmggling by others. Farmers along the north coast, for instance, employed
parapolice personnel at farm expense to patrol the coast and intercept unfriendly
~~landestine itnports, and all tarmers employed extensivc networks of mata-maGa
to ferret out lvcal black marketeers and enstue that the fazm dominated the local
market".
In the last decades of the runeteenth century the Javartese econorny experi-
enced large economic fíuctuations. The early 1880s were prosperous years because
of the expansion of commercial agriculttue, in partic.ular sugar and coffee. [n the
second half of t.he 1880s the economic tide ttuned, because of bad harvests due
to diseases in crops and declitting world prices of sugar. The year 1887 was a
disastrous year for opium tax fazming since 15 of the 19 Javanese farms collected
insufí'i~ient revenues to pay tlteit mont.hly farm fee. Despite of the lenient policy
h~- t.he Dutch governmeut, several opinm tax farms went bartkrupt in the cotuse
of thc following years.
3.2 Opium data
As indic~ated in t.he previous section, in the course of the, year 1894 the opiutn
regie was introcíuct.~cí in ivladura, an island close to Java. After t.hat in subsequent
years in more dist.ricts of Java the opium regie was introduced (see Appendix 1
for det,ails).
We have gathered onr opium data from administrative files. From the t.ax
farming period we have information on the amounts of raw opium delivered by
the government to the tax farmer. In the process of refming raw opittm some of
the opitmt got lost., so these amotmts are not necessarily equal to the amounts
constuned. There is also information aboat the opittm sales of the tax farmer to
11the opium consumers. However, the latter figure does not. seem to be very reliable.
In various reports on the matt,er the Dutch government. doubts the revenue figitres
reported by the tax farmer. For the tax farming period we use the gross amounts
of opiiun. Basically we assiune that the opium loss in the refining process is
balanced by the tax farmers through adding of dilntions. Since in the refiiilng
process no morphine is lost the morphine contents of the raw and the refined
opitun are about. the same (Addens (1938)). In our analysis we assnme that the
morplrine content is determining the narcotic effect of opium and therefore of
great influence on the amounts of opium consiuned.
For the opium regie period we cise direct information about opium amounts
sold to the consiuner (see Appendix 1 for details). We present total opiiun con-
siunption in Java over the períod 18731907 in Figure 1. This figtue shows t.hat.
in the years 1874 and 1875 there is a strong increase in total opium c:onsump-
tion on Java from about 70,000 to almost 100,000 kilograms. In the early 1880s
there is a sharp decline to about 60,000 kilograms. The development, of opium
corrsumption seetns to have been infíuenced by economic conditions. ~i'ith t.he
introduction of the opium regie the opiiun consumption declines to abont. 30,000
kilograms per year. This decline continues until the end of the tax farming sys-
tem. The question we will consider in the empirical section is whether t.his cíecline
in total opium consiunption is catised by the introduction of the opium regiF or
whether other reasons can be fotrnd. After 1904 opium consutnption increases
somewhat.
We also have information about opium consumer prices. Again, for t.he first
years t.he tax farmer reported this informat.ion. However, since the opium con-
sumer price is much easier to check by the government, and as a matter of fact.
was checked by local government officials, t,he consumer prices are yuit.e reliable.
F;'om the regie period we have information about opium revenues. We cale;iilateci
average opium prices as the ratio of revenues to quant.ities. Figure 2 shows t.he
development of consiuner opium prices. In the first years, tmtil t.he begiiuung
of the 1880s opium price falls from about 450 girilders per kilogram to about.
350 guilders. In 1884 t.here is a sharp increase back to 450 guilders. Starting
in 1891 there is a gradual increase in the opitun price to about 600 guilders by
the end of the tax farming system. It is obvious from figiue 2 that ihe average
regiP price is locver than the tax farm price (apart from the period 189fr98 when
the average prices are about the same). Since the morphine content of regie
opium is higher than t.he morphine content of tax fatm opiiun, this means that
there was a subst.ant.ial decrease in effective opiiun price. After the transition
period the opium price increases, but. apart from some fluct.uations the pric~e is
12approximately constaatt at about 480 guilders per kilogram.
From a point of view of the economic aztalysis it is not the nominal but the real
opium price t,hat. is important. To deflate the opiitm price we use the price of rice
as t,he bc~st. available indicator for the general development of the consumer prices
(Creut.zberg (1978); sE~e Appendix 1 for details). Figure 3 shows the development
of the real opium price (in 1873 grtilders per kilogram). Now, there is a big
increase in 1884 which coincides with the sharp decline in opitun consurnption in
the same period. Tltis increase is due t,o both the increase in the nominal price
and t.he decrease of the average consumet prices. After the introduction of the
opium regie there are strong fluctuations in the real opium price with a downward
trend. Apparently, a price decline is at least responsible for the increase in opium
consumpt.ion after 1904.
It is int.eresting to look at the price differences between the districts. Figitre
4 gives the standard deviation of the district opium prices. As is clear from
this figure t.he price dispersion in the 1870s is yuite substantial, with a st.andard
dcriation between 150 and 200 guilders per kilogram. In the 1880s and 1890s the
standard cíeviation of the district opium prices is fluctuat.ing around 100 giulders
per kilogram. Under the regie, prices are harmonized. In fact the opitrnt price
wss the same in many districts. Therefore, in the beginning of the twentieth
cent.iuy t.here is a sharp decline in the price dispersion. In the 1920s the opinm
prices in all districts of Java were equalized.
Obcioiusly, imder the tax farm system there was a substantial price dispersion
between districts. In some districts opium was nmch more expensive than it
w:~.~ in ether dist.ricts. An interest,ing qnestion is whether these price differences
are st;ible over t.ime. It could be that the ranking of districts from high to low
opium price was cortst.ant or only slowly changing over t.ime. Table 1 indicat.es
t.hat. this is not the case. Iu this table we present (Spearmazt) rank-correlation
c~oefficients for annual district, opium prices. For every year we ranked the districts
frotu the highest. to the lowest opium price. Then we calciilated the correlations
bet,ween t.he dist.rict ranking in a particular year and those of the two snbsequent
years. For example: the correlation between the district ranking in 1873 and t.he
ranking in 1874 is 0.36, which is not significantly different from zero at a 5~0
level of significance. Therefore, we cannot reject the null-hypothesis that both
rankings are independent. With a few exceptions this is the conch~sion we have
wit.h respect t.o all correlations snown in Table 1. Not only was there a wide price
dispersion, there were also rapid changes in relative prices so t.hat what was a
~~heap opium district in one year was not as cheap in the next year.
Apart from information about quantities and prices of opium we are also
13interested in information about the smuggling of opium. Rush (1990) provides
abundant qualit.at.ive information about this phenomenon. ~~'e trse administ.rative
files from which we gathered quantitative information about smuggling in terms
of the number of illegal opitun interceptions and the amounts intercept,ed. Figure
5 pre5ents the evolution over time of the number of int.erceptions of illegal opium.
As is shown, there is a substantial increase in tlus nurr,ber in the 1870s. In 18ï3
there were about 1,500 interceptions, by t.he end of the 1870s this increaseci to
an annual number of about 7,000 interceptions. The st.ochastic nature of the
number of interceptions is clear from the big flnctuations. By t.he end of the
1880s there is a major decline in the number of interceptions. In the transition
period from t.ax fazming to government monopoly the mrmber of interceptions
is substantially lower than before. We do not know what cat~sed t.his decline.
It corild be that there was less smuggling. It cotrld also be that the tax farmers
were more efficient. in combatting opitun smuggling. ~~'e do know that. ant,i-opiurn
smuggling activities were intensified dtiring the txansit.ion period and thereafter.
The police force was enlarged in every region where the regie was introduced.
Figute 6 shows the amotmts of intercepted illegal opium. By and large, thc
pattern is the same as in Figure 5. The amotmt intercepted is the largest at the
end of the 1870s and the beginning of the 1880s, when annually 7,500 kilograms
were intercepted. In the transition period and t.he period after t.hat the amotmts
intercepted are negligible.
We also have an indication of world market opitun prices. For this we t~se
information about the production costs of refined opium produced by the Dutch
government. These costs ate determined by t.he production costs and world rnar-
ket. prices of opium. Since production costs are low and there are not many
fluctuations in production costs, the fíuctuations in the opium costs are largely
due to flnctuat.ions in the world mazket prices. Figure 7 shows the evolution of
the costs of opinm over the period 1873-1907. Again, we tise the rice price a5
a deflator. In t.he mid 1880s there is a doubling of the real opitun costs, which
is partly becatrse of the decline in the average constuner prices, and paztly due
to an increase in world market opium ptices. It is rematkable that t.his increase
coincides wit.h the major drop in the amotmts of intercepted illegal opitun as
presented in Figtue 6. Maybe the rise in opium costs made it less attractive for
smugglers to continue their activities. In t.he beginning of the 1890s there is a
major decrease in the opium costs until the level is about. the same as before
the increase. The fíuctuations in the opium costs later on arc: largely due to
Huctuations in average consumer prices.
144 Empirical analysis
An obvious determinant of opitun constunption is its real price which theoreti-
cally has a negative effect. )}trthermore, real income may have affected opiiun
consumption. As a proxy for this we iise real daily wages of coolies working on
plantations. This wage is an important indicator of the socio-economic position
of the Javanese popiilation (see Appendix 1 for details). As shown in Figiue
8 t.here is a strong increase in real wages in the begirming of the 1880s. T}vs
increase is pazt.ly due to the decline of the consiuner prices, but there is also a
subst.atttial nominal wage increase. In the beginning of the 1890s there is a shatp
deriline in real wages. After that there are big fluctuations in real wages, which
mostly have to do with fíuctuations in the constuner prices.
Variables related to opitun smuggling may also be important deterrninants of
legal opium consumption. We use the annual munber of interceptions of illegal
opium as a~~ i~,dicator of the size of the illegal opium tnarket. Apart frmm ~hserveci
dilferences bet.ween dist.ricts there are also many unobserved district differences
which we assume to be time invariant. These differences have to do with the
economic stnicture, the structtue of the population, the presence of large cities
etr.etera. To accotmt for these time invariant differences we introduce district
fixed effects. Finally, as indicated in the previotts section there were big economic
fhrct.uations and there was population growth. To account for the calendar time
Huctuations we introduce a set of calendar year fixed effects. We use the following
loglinear demand specification:
9r.r -~o.r f Iji.~ f~2.4i.r-t f~3.Pi.~ t Qn.wi,r f ij5.6~,r. -~ E~,~ (1)
where q dc:notr~s the natural logarithm of the annual opiimi constunption in kilo-
gr~ms, p is the natural logarithm of t.he real opium price, w is the nattrral log-
arithm of the real wage and 6 represents the nattiral logarithm of the annual
number of interceptions of illegal opiiun. ~rrthermore, j is a subscript for region,
f a subscript for time, and e is the disttubance term. Note that we also intro-
duced t.he lagged dependent variable as explanatory variable, which enables us
t,o distingtrish between short term and long term effects: p3 represents the short
term price elast,icity, Q3~(1 - Qz) gives the long term price elasticity, Q4 gives the
short term wage elasticity and ~34~(1 - QZ) the long term wage elasticity. In our
analysis we distinguish three periods. The first is t.he pro-t.ransikion period until
1895. The second is the period of the early years of the fiill implementation of
the ohiurn rcgie in Java, that is from 1904-1907. Finally, we consider the period
of trvisition.
154.1 Opium tax farm
We start our analysis in the tax farming period, investigating the year from
1875 to 1894, right. before the introduction of the opium regie. Table 2 shows
the estimation results. In t.he first artd the third cohrmn of Table 2 the lagged
dependent variable is left out. In the third and the fourt.h cohtmn the real ~~.age
is left ont.
In t.he first. column of Table 2 the estimated price elasticity of opium consump-
tion is -0.23, while the wage elastícity ofopium constunption is 0.16. Ftitrthermore.
the mtmber of interceptions has a negative effect on the opittm constunption. If
this number increases with 1 percent, opium consumption declines with O.lelo.
We also investigated whether the annual amotmt of int.ercepted illegal opiwn
influences the opittm consutnption, but we did not find such an effect.. Proba-
bly there is more systematic vasiation in the nutnber of interceptiotts, while in
the amount intercepted there is a big random component.. Neither the number
of interceptions nor the quantities intercepted are inflnenced by the real opium
price. Finally, we investigated the possible endogeneity of t.he opium price by
ttsing a Hausman test procedtue12. We regressed the opittm price on a mtmber
of instntmental variables13. Then we ttsed the residuals from the price-regression
as additional right hand side variable in the demand equation. Since rhe coef-
ficient of this variable was not significant different. from zero we conclude that.
endogeneity of the opium price is not a problem.
The second cohtmn Table 2 shows that. the lagged dependent variable has
a signi6cant effect. on ctrrrent consttmption. Since t.he coefficient, of the lagged
dependent variable is about 0.5, long term effects are about t.wice the size of short
term effects. The short term price elasticity is -0.15, the long t.erm price elasticity
is about -0.3. So, the price elasticities are not very large and are substantially
smaller than Van Outs (1995) finds for the opium consumption dttring the opium
regie of the 1920s and 1930s. In the second column the coefficient of the wage
does not differ significazitly from zero. Therefore, we present estimation resttlts
in t.he third azid fourth column omit,ting the wage variable. The estimates of the
remaining coefficients are hardly affected by thisla. All in all, we conchtde that
'ZThis procedure investigate whether there is a correlation between a right hand side variable
and the error term of the regression. If there is a correlation this variable is considered to be
endogenous.
'~As instruments we used the natural logarithm of the lump-sutn paid at the auction, the
lagged and the ta.ice lagged value of this variable, the lagged and the twice lagged price and
the other exogenous variables.
'aWe aLso investigar~ whether there was a correlation between the lagged dependent variable
and the error term oEthe regression equation but we found no evidence of such a correlation.
16opium consumption was influence by opium price, opium smuggling and lagged
opium constunpt.ion.
One of the astonishing restilts in Table 1 is the low price elasticity. The two
economic phenomena of an addictive good and a private monopoly have different
implications for the elasticity of demand. On the one hand, hard dritgs are
assutnecí to be addictive. Addict.ive goods are assumed to have a small price
elasticit.y i.e. the demand for addictive goods is inelastic. Indeed, this is what we
fiud for opium. On the other hand, a profit maximizing monopoly will charge a
price such t.hat. t.he price-quantity combination is in the elastic part of the demand
ctuve Since the price elasticity is in the inelastic region the monopolist charges
too low a price. By increasing the price the tax farmer should have been able to
increase profits15.
There are some explaztations for this phenomenon. The first possible explana-
tion of t.he low mackét pricc is the existenGe of a competitive fringe of smugglers.
Since t.he worlcí market. price for opitrm is far below the price the tax farmer
has to pay to thc: goverrunent., the price the tax farmer charges is substantially
above the world market price. This creat.es an incentive for smugglers to enter the
opinm market. In case t.he monopolist acts as a price leader and the smugglers
are a cornpetitive fringe:
f (P) f (P) - 9 (P) f (P) - 9 (P) - . fn - n~ f(~) '~~ f(n) ' ~ f(n) - s(n) - Fn (2)
where eF, is the price elasticity of t,ot.al rnarket demand, f(p) is the market demartd
c~iuve, y(p) the supply curve of the smugglers and ep is the price elasticity of the
demand for legal opium. So, competition forces the price elasticity upwards,
rechtcing the el~vt.icity of rnatket demand.
A problem wit.h this explanation is that we do not observe the market demand
because we do not observe the (illegal) supply by t,he competitive fringe. We
orily obsen.e the legal opittm sold by the monopolist. Therefore, even though t.he
price elasticity of market demand is inelastic, the price elasticity of the observed
dernand for opium, that is opium sold by a profit maximizing tax farmer shottld
st.ill be iu the elast.ic range. So, a simple model of a price leading tax farmer
c~annot explain the observation of an inelastic demand for opitun.
The second possible explanation of a low price is the model with dynamic
litnit,pricing (Gaskins (1971)). In stead of myopic maxirnization a tax farmer
may take fitture competition into accotmt. Then, the optimal pricing strategy
''Of course under the particular assumption of a constant price elasticity prices could end
up eer}~ high.
17does not. maximize current profits, but will maximize the present value of t.he
profits.
V - ~~(P(t) - c).ïa(g'(t)).e-.adt - 0 (3)
where V is the present value of the t.ax farmers' profit stream, h(p) - f(p) - q(p)
is the residual demand curve, t is an index of time and r is the disc~ount rate
of t.he tax farmer. The rate of ent.ry of new producers will depend on the price
set. by the donunant. producer and the production costs of the new producers.
If t.he prodnct.ion costs of the new producers are higher than those of the pric~c
leader, the ptice leader rnay charge a"limit price" that is above the cornpetitive
market price and will still prevent new producers from entering the market. The
optimal price level along the optimal path will be always below the short. run
profit,maxirnizing price. Gaskins (1971) also shows t.hat the dominant firm will
disappear from the market if it does not have a cost advantage and clairns that
only in a growing market a dominant firm without. a cost advantage can survive.
The latter claim has been disputed by Ireland (1972) on the basis of the part.icirlar
spec.ification of the reaction function in Gaskins' model. An example of the use
of the dynamic limit pricing model in a historical context is Carlos aiid Brown
Kn~se (1996) who iLSe t.he dynamic limit pricing model to explain the decline
of t.he Royal African Company hecause of increased competit.ion by smugglers.
There are two reasons why the dynamic limit. pricing model is hard to use in
case of the opium market. First, tax farmers have a short time horizon since
t.heir concession lasts only three years. Second, their cost of producing opiurn are
subst.antially higher than those of the snmgglers.
We conclude that the low price of opinm cannot be explained by cising simple
models of cornpetition between the tax farmers and smugglers. Compet.ition
amongst the tax farmers may also have been important. As indicat.ed before .
t.here was severe competition between t.he tax farmers in t.he sense that each
farmer had an incentive to smuggle his own opinm to a neighboring district in
order to sell it there, t.hereby nndermining the posit.ion of his competit.or. Snch
more complex models of competition are beyond the scope of the cirrrent paper.
4.2 Government monopoly: the early years
~~~e limit the analysis of the opium re~ie to the period 1904-1907. The main teason
to start in 1904 is t.hat this is t.he first year in which the opiurn regie is present.
in every dist.rict. of Java. The main reason to stop in 1907 is that after this vear
the opium prices are the same in most. of the Javanese districts. Table 3 shrnvs
18the estimation resrilts for the period 1904-1907. The first cohmin shows that the
price elasticity has a value of -1.3, which is quite large (in absohrte terms). The
effect. of the nnmber of int.erceptions of illegal opium ís significantly negative but
srrbstantially smaller than drrring the tax farming period. Wages did not have a
significant effect. on opirun constunption so we did not include the wage variable
in the regressions. As in the case of the tax farming period we formd no evidence
of endogeneity of the opirun price.
The second column of Table 3 shows that the lagged dependent vaziable has
a significant, effect on crrrrent consrrmption. After the introduction of the lagged
dependent variable the short term price elasticity is -1.65, while the coefficient.
of the number of interceptions of illegal opirun is not significantly different from
zero. The implied long term price elasticity is -2.5.
We conclude that at the start of the opium regie opium prices have a large
effect on opium consumption. The illegal opirun market has a small negative
effect. on legal opium consrunption. We find no evidence of a significant wage
effect.
4.3 The transition period
In 189-1 the opium regie was introduced in the first distríct, Madtua. We use data
startiug from 1~95, since that is t.he first fiill year that. the opium regie was in
prrtctie~.. ln sr.bsequent years t.he opium mgie was introduced in the other districts
of .lava icnt.il in 1904 all district were rmder the new opiiun regime (see Appendix 1
for the exact timing ofevents). To investigate whether the regime change affected
the opinm consumption it. is difficult to apply a rmiltivariate demand a~ralysis as
the one we just discussed. There is a rneasuremerrt issue with respect t.o bot.h
the quantity and t.he price of opium. Therefore, we ruse the sirnple '`difference
in differences" approach presented in Table 4 to get an idea about the effects
of the regime switch. The first column of Table 4 pcesents the chaiige in opium
consumpt.ion of the districts which am imder t.he opium regie for the first. year.
This change indicates the effect of t.he change from t,ax farming t.o opium regie,
but also t.he effect. of changing economic conditions. The second column shows
the nhange in opium consrurrption in those districts that were still rmder the tax
farming regime and thics represents the effects of changing economic condítions.
The third colunm does t.he same for districts who are imder the opium regie
for at least two years. The fourt.h column gives the average change for distsicts
nnclcr eit.her t.he tax farming or the opium regie regime. So, the fourth column
represents t,he effect of changing economic. conditions. If we take the difference
19in opium consumption in t.he fotuth cohunn and in the first. cohunn then we
calctilate the separat.e effect of the change in opium regime. This effect is shown
in the fifth cohunn. Averaged over the period 1895-1904 the opium consumption
in tax farming districts and districts that were tmder the opium regie regime for
more than a year declined with 3.2`7o per year. The average decline in the first
year of t.he new regime was 38.5~10. Therefore, the difference of -35.3`'ío can be
attribut.ed to t.he change from tax farm to opium regie.
Table 5 shows t.he estimation results for the transition period of some simple
regressions wit.h growth rates as dependent variables. Hete, we test whether the
grow~th of t.he quantity consumed ín the first year of the opium regie as c~ompared
to t.he quantity constuned in the previotts year (the last yeaz of the tax farm) is
different from t.he similar growth between two years within the tax farm period
ot within the regie period. The first column shows that t.he arumal growth of thc
quantit.ies constuned in the yeazs considered was -3.9010, whereas in the first ye~ir
of the opium regie there was an additional decline of 39.8`7ols. This decline is in
line with the restilts of Table 4.
We did similar analyses for the changes in real opitmt price and the munber
of interceptions of illegal opium. F`com the second column of Table 5 it appears
that the average opium price dtuing the years considered increased wit.h 2.9o1c,
per year. In the first year of the opium regie there was an opitmi price decline of
9.4Plotr.
Finally, it appears that the munber of interceptions of illegal opitun increased
with 145PIo in the first yeaz of the opium regie. Tlus reflects the fact t.hat with the
introduction of the opium regie the policy force was enlazged and the attempts
t.o fight smuggling were intensified. Since we did not find such atr effect. in t.he
second year of the opium regie, the higher level of the number of interceptions
holds for all regie years under consideration.
4.4 The efiects of the change in opium policy
As indicated in Section 3 for the tax farming period we use informatíon about
raw opinm while for t.he regie period we ttse information about tefined opinm.
The refining was necessary t.o produce a smokeable variety of opium. Dtuing the
process of refining some quantity of opitun was lost, but there were no losses of
~sWe also im-estigated whether there was an additional decline of the quantity of opium in
the second yeaz of the regie. That urould indicate that there was a d'vect and a laggerl eEect.
We found no evidence of such an effect.
~~Again, we investigated whether there a-as an additional decGne or an increase ofthe opium
price in the second cear of the regie, but found no evidence of such an effect.
20morphine. Since the tax farmers added dihttions to the refined opium the mor-
phine content of t.ax farm opirun was comparable to that of raw opium. Druing
the opium regie less dilutions were added and therefore the morphine content of
refined regie opium was larger than that of farm opium. In our calctrlation of the
effects of the charrge in opiurn policy we have to take the differences in morphine
content into account.
The decline in opitun price of 9.4oïo in the first year of the regie we found in the
previous subsectiou is the price per kilogram of tegie-opium as compared to the
price per kilogram of tax farm-opitun. Since the morphine content of regie-opium
was higher than t.he morphine content of tax farm opium this means that. t.here
was a snbstantial price decline in terms of morphine content. If we assiune that.
tax farm opium contained 8elo morphine18 and the price of tax farm opium was
500 guilders per kilogram, then the price of a kilogram tax farm morphine was
G250 guilders. The price of a kilogram of regie opitun was about 450 guilders per
kilograrn, so with a morphine content of 12"loly the price of a kilogram of regre
morphine was 3750 guilders. In this case the price of a kilogram of morplrine
weut. down with 40Io at the introduction of the opium tegie.
An important restrlt of the figtrres in Tables 4 and 5 is the conchrsion that the
regime switch catrsed the quantity of opirun purchased to decline with 35-40010.
Now, the quest.íon is to what extent tlus decline represents an actual decrease in
opium corLSUmption in terms of quarrtit.ies of morphine constuned. If we normalize
t.he c}uantity of opium sold t.o 100 kilograms in the tax farm period and assume
that t his opium ront.ained 8`7e of morphine 8 kilogtams of morphine was sold.
At the introduction of t.he opiurn rPgie the quantity of opitrm decrease with 35010
t.o G5 kilograms, which contained with a 1201o morphine content 7.8 kilograms
of morphine. So, in this example the introduction of the opium regie cartsed
the morphine consumption t.o decline wit.h 2.5`~0. This is not very much, but as
indicated before we should make a distinction between two separat.e effects of
t.he regime swit.ch. The first. effect is the effect of the price change, the second
is the incent,ive effect, i.e. t.he effect that retailers of opium no longer have au
incent.ive to get. people t.o use opium. The price effect of course depends on
the price elasticit.y, which we asstune to be -0.2, which is quite low. Since the
price decline is 4001o the price effect is 8"l0. So, whereas in our example the price
decline should have increased constunption with 8010, consumption declined with
~RStandard quality of opium fazm Candu was tested by the military pharmacist Haak in
prepazation of thc new regie. He found a morphine content of 8010 (Haak (1889))
19This w~5 the average morphine content of regie opium as reported in the Yearly Accounts
of the opium regie.
212.5010. This means that the total incentive effect is -10.5Q1o. The pure effect of
the transition from tax farming to opium regie causes the amotmt of morphine
constuned to decline with about. 10~0.
Of cottrse the outcome of these calculations depends to a large extent on the
assnmptions with respect to the morphine content of tax farm opinm. If the
assnmed morphine cont.ent. is higher, the price decline and t.htus the price effect is
smaller, bnt the total effect is sitbstantially larger. Therefore, the incentive effect
increases with the morphine cont.ent. Table 6 shows the out.comes of alrernative
calctilations. With a morplrine content of farm opitrm of 9Qlo the incent.ive effect
is -20QIo, at 101o it. is -27PIc and at 12~1o it is -37oio.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze the effects of a change in opium policy in Java. In the
nineteenth century t,here was a system of t,ax farms, which were private district:
based monopolies. By the end of the nineteenth century a government monopoh~
on opitrm was introduced. Under this so-called opium regie import, refinement
and retailing were fiilly tmder control of the government. Our analysis focuses
on the effects of this change in opitrm policy. In our analysis we use annual
administrative data for 15 Javanese districts over t.he period 1873-1907.
Fl~om the analysis of the tax farm period we conclude that opium consurnption
is affected by opium prices and opitun smuggling. We also find an effect of lagged
opitrm consumption. So, in economic terms there are short rtm and long run
effects. Long term effects are about twice the size of short. term effects. Short
term price elasticity is -0.15, long term price elasticity is about -0.3. Fl-om the
analysis of the start of the regie period we conclude that the regie opium prices
have a large effect. on opitun constrmption. The illegal opium market has a srnall
negative effect on legal opium consumption.
The informat.ion from the transition period enables us to directly investigate
the effects of t.he change in opitun policy. The first effect is due to the change in
t.he price. The price per qnantit,y of opium went down, the price per quantity of
morphine went. down even more because the morphine content of regie opium was
higher than the morphine content of t.ax fazm opium. The declining price had a
positive effect on t.he constrmption of opitun of abont 5-lOoÍo. The second effect is
the incent.ive effect. Tax fazmers had an incentive to expand their market. Tkus
incentive vanished under the regie. We estimate the negative incent.ive effect on
t,he constrmption of opinm to be abont 10-25P1o.
What are the lessons from opium history for present-day drug policy? First,
~,~we conchide that the demand for drugs is ser~sitive to the price of drngs. If legal-
izat.iou of drngs lowers t.he price of drngs this w~ll stim~ilate consLUnption. How-
ever, since there probably are many small consitrnets that are rather recreational
iisers rather t.han drug addicts the welfare effects will be limited. Fiuthermore,
we find that if government t.akes ovet the drug biisiness, t.his has a subst.antial
negative effect on drng nse because of the incentive effect. All in all, we think that
a policy of controlled legalization of drug use can be more effective in controlling
drugs and redncing drug consnmptiou than a policy of prohibition is.
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26Appendices
1 Details on the data
The data were published in the yearly `Accormts of the Opiumtegie', 1915-1938
and the Colonial Reports, 1873-1940. During the last years ofthe opium tax fazm,
data were collected for 22 districts. During the first yeazs of the opium regie, 18
dist.ricts were distinguished. We were able to combine the information from the
different data sources into one consistent dataset in which the following 15 dis-
tricts are distinguished: Batavia (including Banten, Krawang and Priangan),
Ceribon, Pekalongan (including Tegal), Semarang (including Japara), Rembang,
Surabaya, Pasuruan (including Probolinggo), Besuki, Banyumas, Kedu (includ-
ing Bagelen), Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Madiun, Kediri, Madura. In t.he Western
part of .Java, in Bantam and Priangan opittm farms were not allowed although
there was a handfiil of legal outlets (Rttsh (1990)). During the opium regie ogiuill
was sold in these districts.
The first. year of the opium regie was:
- 1895 for nladura (actual stazt September 1, 1894)
- 1896 for Pasuruan, Besuki
- 1899 for Surabaya
- 1901 for Dladiun, Kediri
- 1902 for Semaraztg, Rembang
- 1903 for Bat.avia, Djokja, Sttrakarta
- 190-1 for Ceribon, Pekalongan, Bany~tmas, Kedu
1.1 Quantities
In international treaties raw or "soft" opittm is defined as "the spontaneottsly
coagnlated juice, obtained from the capsttles of Papaver somniferum L., which has
only been submit.t.ed to the necessary manipulations for packing and transport,
whatever its content of morphine" . Smoke opium is defined as "the product of raw
opium, obt.ained by a series of special operations, especially by dissolving, boiling,
roasting and fermentation, designed to transform it into an extract suitable for
consnmption". During the process of prepazing smoke opittm about 40QIo of the
raw opium is lost.2~ However, becattse of special precautions in the production
IoFrom cofonial reports and reports on the opium factory we derive that the percentage of
refined opium out of raw opium increased from about 53q in 1894 to about 6301o in 1907. In
subsequent years apart from fluctuations this percentage was about constant.
27process no morplrine was lost. Therefore, the morphine content of smoke opium
can be substantially higher than the morphine content of raw opirtm (Addens
(1938)). Smoke opium made by the regie factory had a morphine content of 10-
13~10, with an average of 12Q1o. Tax farTrr opium had a lower morphine content
because the tax farmers diluted their opium. We assume that tax farm opium
had a morphine content between 8 and 10 010.
1.2 Prices
The value of opium is deterrnined by t.he morplrine content (Addens (1938)).
Since the morphine content of regie opium was substantially higher than the
morphine content. of tax fatm opirrm the prices during bot.h regimes are cíifficult.
to compare. To get. an impression about the meaning of t.he opium price for
the consumer we need real prices in stead of nominal prices. Previous research
(Polak (1943)) indicat.es that. in the period 1921-1939 the costs of living are highly
correlated with the price of rice. We assiune t.hat this was also the case in t.he
period 1873-1907 arrd we itse the price of rice as an indicator for the costs of
living, i.e. the average consumer price level. Figtrre A1 presents the evolution
of the rice price over the period 1873-1907. It is obviotrs that there are largc
fluctuations from year to year. Apart. from that there is a major decline in t.he
beginning of the 1880s when the price drops more than 30~10.
1.3 Wages
Dros (1992) giv~ an overview ofdaily wages of colies employed by plantations in
Java, distingtrished by district. He derived this information from various Colonial
R.eports starting with t.he year 1875. We tLSe information for the period 1875-1907.
Dros gives no single wage btrt the highest and lowest daily wages respect,ively.
Sometimes these figtrres diverge considerable, e.g. from 25 to 80 cents daily.
The majority of the workers was probably nearer to the lower end than to t.he
higher end of the sale. The average of the highest and t.he lowest. wage is no
correct. representation ofthe average wage. However, sínce we have no information
about t.he distribution of wage earners we take the average and assume that
changes in this average aze informative about changes in the true average daily
wage. The wages of coolies are important in two respects. First, a large share
of the population was working in the agricriltrrral sector. According to the 1878
Census 82P1o of the male labor forces was mainly employed in agricultural prtrsuits.
According to t.he 1905 Census this was even 85`io (Dros (1992)). Second, opirrm
corrsrtmption was to a large ext.ent located in the group of coolies.
~gTable 1 Itank-correlation coefficients for price levels during tax farm
period; 1873-1894a~
Year t Year t-f l Year t~-2 Year t Year tt1 Yeat tt2
1873 0.36 -0.16 1884 -0.02 0.33
1874 0.02 0.48 1885 -0.20 -0.11
187.5 -0.18 0.05 1886 0.33 -0.04
187G 0.82 0.16 1887 -0.59 -0.32
1877 0.35 -0.22 1888 0.13 -0.39
1878 0.20 -0.36 1889 -0.14 -0.31
1879 0.25 0.25 1890 -0.19 0.03
1880 0.32 0.63 1891 0.15 -0.31
1881 0.30 0.34 1892 0.60 0.63
1882 p.82 0.00 1893 0.19 -
1883 0.20 0.14
a~ Bold figures are correlations that differ from 0 at a SPIo level of significance
Table 2 Estimation results tax farming period, quantities of opium;
1874-1894a~
p -0.26 (3.5) -0.14 (2.1) -0.25 (3.4) -0.13 (2.0)
u.~ 0.18 (2.2) 0.10 (1.4)
b -0.10 (4.6) -0.05 (2.8) -0.09 (4.3) -0.05 (2.6)
q-t 0.51 (9.2) 0.52 (9.4)
Ctz 0.92ï 0.944 0.926 0.945
"~ Ordiuary Least squares, included in the regressions are district fixed effects and cal-
endar year fixed effects; t-values in parentheses; RZ is corrected for degrees of freedom;
uumber of obser~~at.ions - 300
29Table 3 Estimation results opium regie period, quantities of opium; 1904-
1907a~
p -1.31 (3.3) -1.66 (4.4)
6 -0.04 (3.1) -0.02 (1.3)
q-t 0.33 (2.8)
R2 0.995 0.996
a~ Ordinary Least Squazes, included in the regressions are district fixed effects and cal-
endar year fixed effects; t-values in pazentheses; R2 is corrected for degrees of freedom;
number of observations - 60 (56 in equations with a lagged dependent variable)
Table 4 Opium quantities; annual growth in o10; 1895-1904 (number of
districts)
Break Tax farm Regie Effect policy
(a) (b) (c) (b)~-(c) (a)-(b)-(c)
1895 6.6 (1) 11.2 (14) - 11.2 (14) -4.6a~
1896 -56.3 (2) -15.3 (12) -11.8 (1) -15.0 (13) -41.3
1899 -22.1 (1) 3.3 (11) 0.3 (3) 2.7 (14) -24.8
1901 -29.7 (2) 7.3 (9) -8.0 (4) 2.6 (13) -32.3
1902 -57.9 (2) -12.3 (7) -13.3 (6) -12.8 (13) -45.1
1903 -34.5 (2) -30.8 (4) -6.9 (8) -16.1 (12) -18.4
1904 -39.7 (5) - 5.7 (10) 5.7 (10) -45.4
A verage -38.5 (15) -2.8 (58) -3.8 (32) -3.2 (90) -35.3
al The 6gure for 1895 underestimates the decline because the regie was already intro-
duced September 1, 1894.
30Table 5 Estimates of the annual growth of various opium indicators;
1895-1904a~
9- 4-i P- p-t b- b-1
tren.d -0.039 (2.3) 0.029 (2.3) -0.110 (1.2)
t' -0.398 (9.0) -0.094 (2.8) 1.450 (5.9)
RZ 0.435 0.064 0.246
"1 R2 is corrected for degrees of freedom; ssr-sum of squared residuals, t' is the first
~ear of the opium regie ; number of obser~ations - 105
Table 6 Calculated effects of the change in opium policy, under different
assumptions with respect to the morphine content of fazm opium (qo)al
~lorphine Price change Price effect Total effcet Incentive effect
("a) (L) (c)-.0.2~`(b) (d) (d)-(c)
8 -40.0 f8.0 -2.5 -10.5
9 -32.5 ~6.5 -13.5 -20.0
10 -25.0 f5.0 -22.0 -27.0
1'? -10.0 f2.0 -35.0 -37.0
"~ Assumptions: Farm opium - 500 guilders~kilogram; Regie opium - 450 guilders~kilogram;
morphinr. content regie opium - 120l0; price elasticity --0.2; effect policy change in
t~~rms nE kilograms of opium --35~10.
31Figure 1 Opium consumption; 1873-1907 (1000 kilograms~year)
32Figure 2 Opium price; 1873-1907 (Dutch guilders~kilogram)
33Figure 3 Real opium price; 1873-1907 (1873 Dutch guilders~kilogram)
3iFigure 4 5tandard deviation of district opium prices; 1873-1907 (Dutch
guilders~kilogram)
35Figure 5 Interceptions of illegal opium; 1873-1907 (1000)
36Figure 6 Intercepted illegal opium; 1873-1907 (1000 kilograms)
3ïFigure 7 Real costs oFimported opium; 1873-1907 (1873 Dutch guilders~kilogram)
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